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In this paper we study the interrelationship between determinants of migration, conceived as a 
family strategy, and the potential impact of having a migrant household member on people 
left behind. Labour migration is often related to poverty but given its lumpy-investment 
nature, poverty may constitute a motivation to migrate as well as a constraint to do it. We use 
cross-sectional household data from two rural regions of Bangladesh to test whether migration 
is a form of income diversification strategy that significantly influences the risk-taking 
behaviour of source farm households in agricultural activities. We account for heterogeneity 
of migration constraints differentiating between domestic (temporary and permanent) and 
international moving destinations. We find that richer and large-holder households are more 
likely to participate in costly high-return migration (i.e. international migration) and employ 
modern technologies, thereby achieving higher productivity. Poorer households, on the other 
hand, are not able to overcome entry costs of moving abroad and fall back on migration with 
low entry costs, and low returns (i.e. domestic migration), which does not help them to 
achieve production enhancements and may lock them into persistent poverty. We interpret our 
results as evidence that if migration is a profitable household activity, entry constraints may 
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1. Introduction   
Migration from developing countries, and in particular from rural areas, has become a central 
issue of economic development, but whether this process should be promoted or discouraged 
is currently largely debated. This paper contributes to the debate shedding some light on the 
potential complementarity between overseas economic opportunities and productive activities 
in rural households at origin. It looks, in particular, at the economic impact of domestic and 
international migration on such productive investment in sending households as the adoption 
of a modern farming technology. 
It is largely recognised that ‘spatially-diversified’ families represent an institution arising 
from or influenced by the risky nature of rural production and the difficulties of self-insurance 
in low-income, rural settings (Rosenzweig, 1988). The insurance motives for migration has 
been emphasised by the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM), according to which 
greater income uncertainty may encourage out migration as a risk diversification strategy (see 
Stark, O. and Levhari, D., 1982; Daveri and Faini, 1994). In this sense, better “insured” 
source households - those with migrants working elsewhere - should be more able to 
undertake higher-risk profitable activities than households with no migrants. Furthermore, 
subsequent remittances from migrant members increase household liquidity and may 
contribute to alleviate binding credit constraints in productive activities (Katz, E. and Stark, 
O. 1986; Stark, 1991).  
On the other hand, though, migration of people entails a loss of labour force and human 
capital resources in the place of origin; this is likely to influence production choices as well, 
especially in farm households in developing countries largely recognised to be highly 
dependent on family labour for their subsistence. Therefore, whether the overall economic 
effect of migration on rural households at origin will be positive or negative is difficult to be 
predicted a priori; empirical evidence is needed to better understand the linkages between 
migration and development in local communities.  
This paper contributes in filling this gap by carrying out an empirical analysis on the potential 
effect of migration on productivity-enhancement choices in farm households at origin. We use 
cross-sectional household data from two rural regions of Bangladesh to test whether having a 
migrant member is a significant determinant of the decision of source household to employ a 
modern farming technology, that is high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of rice rather than 
traditional ones. Production of rice is central to Bangladeshi agricultural economy and   3
modern seeds are a relatively spread, divisible and profitable technology, but well-known as 
being more susceptible to yield variability than traditional varieties
1. 
The bulk of empirical contributions on the impact of migration on sending households are 
mostly focused on the role of remittances in improving source household’s consumption or 
income. Given the typical non-separable nature of consumption and production household 
decisions in rural settings with incomplete markets, relatively few empirical works have 
shown the potential impact of migration on household production choices at origin. Among 
these, Rozelle et al. (1999) and Lucas (1987) have shown the growth potential of migration in 
rural contexts of capital market imperfections, whereby remittances accumulated abroad allow 
households to improve their agricultural productivity and to accumulate productive assets.  
Differently from this part of evidence on the NELM hypothesis, though, this paper is 
particularly concerned with the role of entry constraints in undertaking a remunerative and 
risk-reducing migration strategy. Indeed, moving from one place to another is not without 
costs for the whole household; namely, fixed initial financial costs, such as travel, recruiting 
agency and accommodation costs, and opportunity costs to migrate, in terms of forgone 
working capital, skills, yield, and income
2, ought to be sustained. In general, if access to 
profitable activities requires some initial cash outlay or start-up costs (to be paid in advance to 
investment returns), then multiple equilibria are likely to arise and poverty traps phenomena 
may be observed
3.  
In this paper we look at heterogeneity of migration constraints in Bangladeshi farm 
households, differentiating between temporary, permanent and international moving. 
Information on alternative outside destinations included in our data-set show that the latter 
three typologies of migration have sharply different net-returns, in terms of initial costs and 
remittances sent back home. Therefore, although they all represent activity-diversification 
strategies improving farm household risk-management, not all migration forms may induce 
risk-taking behaviour in agricultural production in source households. Moreover, given the 
                                                 
1 Causes of instability are identified mainly in genetic vulnerability and increased covariation across regions. In 
an earlier work of the author it has been shown that adoption of HYVs of rice has a positive impact on household 
wellbeing (see Mendola, 2003). 
2 At a macro level, Faini and Venturini (1994) have argued that the willingness to migrate is constrained by 
inadequate human and physical capital and, for a given wage differential, income per capita increases, in poor 
countries, release individual constraints to migrate and favour outflows. At a given “threshold”, income per 
capita stops being a pushing facto and becomes a restraint factor, when people have achieved enough well-being 
to prefer to stay home rather than to leave. They test this hypothesis to explain the Italian migration hump of the 
beginning of the 90s obtaining very satisfying results.  
3 There are several theoretical and empirical contributions on the consequences of imperfect credit market and 
initial constraints in terms of risk-management capacity, low-risk investment by poorer farmers, ability to 
overcome entry barriers into high-return activities for better-resourced households, poverty traps (Eswaran and 
Kotwan , 1990, Banerjee and Newman 1993; Dercon 1996, 1998, Morduch, 1995)   4
costly nature of moving, poor farmers may well be excluded by the high-costs-high-returns 
opportunities of migration, whilst better-resourced farm households are more likely to take 
advantage of these strategies, which may represent an important route for enrichment through, 
for example, raising agricultural productivity. It follows that determinants of household 
choice (or chance) to have a migrant member will have simultaneous implications on the 
productive capacity of source households and, overall, on the economic effect of migration-
strategy on people left behind. 
By specifying a simultaneous framework of determinants and consequences of migration, this 
study offers some new empirical evidence on the impact of domestic (temporary and 
permanent) and overseas migration opportunities on the adoption of modern farming 
technologies (as a proxy for productivity-enhancement capacity) in sending rural households. 
We argue that the choice between temporary, permanent and international migration at 
household level can provide an interesting ground of analysis to assess the role of entry costs 
in shaping migration choices along with the potential non-monotonic economic impact of 
these strategies on household members at origin.  We do so through a twofold empirical 
analysis: in first place we look at the determinants of household decision of having a migrant 
member, whereby migration choice is mapped into the three categories of moving. After 
showing the importance of heterogeneity of entry constraints – that take the form of wealth - 
in shaping household migration behaviour, we estimate a simultaneous equations model to 
assess the impact of the different typologies of migration on agricultural performance of 
sending farm households.  
We find that richer and large-holder households are more likely to participate in costly high-
return migration (i.e. international migration) and employ modern technologies, thereby 
achieving higher productivity. Poorer households, on the other hand, are not able to overcome 
entry costs of moving abroad and fall back on migration with low entry costs, and low returns 
(i.e. domestic migration), which does not help them to achieve production enhancements.  
The remaining portion of the paper is organised as follows. Section II draws on NELM 
insights to briefly discuss migration as a costly household subsistence strategy that may lead 
to complementarities or else trade offs between economic opportunities elsewhere and 
productive activities at home. Section III discusses some specific feature of internal and 
overseas migration in Bangladesh whilst in section IV we present the data set and descriptive 
statistics of main variables used in the inferential analysis. Section V presents our estimation 
strategy and empirical results and section VI concludes.  
 
   5
2.  Understanding migration: development-strategy or poverty-trap? 
 
Migration is a global social phenomenon and, whatever the perspective taken on this issue, it 
is an ongoing process that surrounds and pervades all aspects of contemporary society. The 
world’s great migrations out of rural areas are accelerating, making internal and international 
migration one of the most pervasive features of agricultural transformations and economic 
development both in developed and less-developed countries.  
Yet, the economic literature on migration provides different explanations of the reasons why 
people move and offers few insights into the role migration plays in fostering (or hindering) 
economic development in sending communities
4.  
Drawing on the seminal work of Stark (1978), the NELM theory has explained migration as 
an inter-temporal household strategy entailing interrelationships between determinants and 
impacts for the migrant and for the whole household left behind (Stark, 1991). Following this 
perspective, a wide array of contributions have emphasised the existence of complex 
motivations behind migration, such as risk-management strategy, alleviation of credit 
constrains and diversification of income portfolios
5. This is opposed to the “expected income 
hypothesis” of Harris-Todaro (1970) that explains migration as an individual one-off 
adjustment to inter-sectorial wages differentials.  
The perception of migration in the latter theory is focused on migrant individual decision 
motivated by imperfections in labour markets. The NELM perspective, on the other hand, has 
widened the way of thinking about migration in that it explains family motivations to send out 
a migrant arising from imperfections not necessarily in labour markets but rather in markets 
for credit and risk. However, “while constituting a motivation for migration, imperfections in 
capital and insurance markets may also constrain migration, resulting in the seeming paradox 
that increases in rural incomes (which enable households to self-finance migration costs and 
self-insure against migration risks) may promote, rather than impede, migration” (Taylor J.E. 
and Martin, P., 2001).  
Following the existing literature on migration, there are three competing channels through 
which this process can affect household members left behind: namely, decreased domestic 
availability of family labour; increased cash-inflows (remittances); diversification of 
                                                 
4 See Williamson (1998), Taylor and Martin (2001) for a review of theoretical foundations and empirical 
evidence on migration issue. 
5 Daveri and Faini (1998) formalise the argument that migration is a household decision driven by risk 
motivations. Using aggregate data, they also provide some evidence on the importance of risk in shaping 
domestic and international emigration behaviour in Southern Italian regions. The micro-economic literature on 
this issue also includes Katz, E. and Stark, O. 1986; Lucas and Stark, 1985,88; Rosenzweig M., 1988; 
Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Lucas, R.E.B., 1997.   6
resources (insurance provision). Yet, what is not clear from the literature is to what extent the 
beneficial effects of migration strategy in protecting household members left behind from 
economic pitfalls are able to improve the productive-investment capacity in sending rural 
households
6.  
Few empirical studies have shown that earnings of international migrants have a positive 
impact on crop productivity and may also serve as a source of capital accumulation in rural 
households (Rozelle et al., 1999; and Lucas, 1987). Yet, little evidence exists, in a 
simultaneous framework, on the role migration costs (or the shadow value of remittances) 
play in shaping the potential impact of migration at origin.  
A large body of migration literature has focused on remittances as the main way households 
are able to smooth their consumption and overcome liquidity or risk constraints for 
investment purposes. Indeed, the contribution of remittances – defined as the money and/or 
goods sent home by migrant workers – to the income level of sending households has been 
typically considered the key variable to assess the impact of migration on economic 
development. It is fairly well known that for many developing countries, remittances are an 
important source of income
7. Moreover, remittances are now largely recognised as part of an 
informal familial arrangement that goes well beyond altruism and entails “exchange motives” 
(Lucas and Stark 1985, Cox et al. 1998)
8. 
However, the linkage between the level of remittances and the development of sending 
households is not straightforward for three orders of reasons. Firstly, the sign and dimension 
of their economic effects depend on a host of intervening (and often conflicting) variables 
such as informational and financial costs of migration and the opportunity cost to move (in 
terms of forgone human and physical capital)
9. In second place, a critical point in order to 
                                                 
6 In other words it is not clear whether remittances sent back by migrants are able to compensate for the 
opportunity cost of allocating a marginal unit of family time to migration, that is the loss of net income from 
production. Household may not be able to simultaneously devote time to migrant labour and to investment 
activities in home areas. Moreover, it has been argued that human and physical capital embodied in (‘certain 
types’ of) migration is likely to complement other family resources in production, strengthening the negative 
effect from less family labour (i.e. “brain drain” argument. See Faini, R. 2003).  Another argument in this 
direction provided by the literature is the one of moral hazard phenomena in sending households: if migrant 
work is lucrative enough household members remaining behind may entirely forgo productive activities and live 
primarily on remittances receipts. For evidence on this see Gubert, F 2000. On the other hand, though, people 
left behind may invest more so as to motivate the migrant to send more remittances (de Janvry et al., 1997). 
7 E.g. South Africa gold workers to neighbouring countries; Mexican migrants in the US; unskilled South Asia 
(e.g. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh) migrants in the Gulf. 
8 According to the “exchange hypothesis” remittances must be seen as repayments for services provided by 
parent household such as childcare, education, bequests and inheritance, coinsurance, social standing. The 
exchange motive can be further divided into insurance motives (to spread risk across a broader portfolio) and 
investment motives (to build up household assets to be inherited later, or to repay previous investments that 
allow the migrant to retain the right to inherit). 
9 Differently said, the same expected value of remittances may not have the same effect on the probability to 
migrate for households at different points in the wealth distribution.   7
assess the impact of migration on economic development is whether remittances are used to 
finance consumption or productive investments
10; yet, the latter analysis is not an easy task 
either, because of fungibility issue, externalities and lack of reliable measures of (net) 
remittances
11. Lastly, remittances are endogenous to the migration selection and typically 
vary directly with the cost, risk and social dislocation associated with the move (i.e. with the 
form of migration). Therefore, the economic effects of remittances are intimately tied to 
migration determinants and cannot be evaluated independently of them. Furthermore, the 
insurance provision provided by family members working in different labour markets may 
influence sending farm households (and their productive capacity) even without remittances 
(Stark 1980).  
Thus, household behaviour towards migration is crucial in shaping the economic effect of this 
process, which may act as a shelter against income and production risks faced by people left 
behind. There is considerable evidence in the development literature on the widespread 
diversification of farm household income sources as a way to manage risk in developing 
countries (see, for example, Morduch, 1995)
 12. There is also growing evidence, though, that 
entry constraints may limit the usefulness of income diversification strategies. This is to say 
that risk-management strategies may imply an efficiency loss for the poor, which the rich – 
typically better protected via assets and institutional arrangements – do not have to endure 
(see Dercon 2002).  
Thus, given incomplete insurance and segmented capital markets, structural characteristics 
and wealth of households typically shape liquidity and risk constraints, thereby influencing 
the incentive to move and the shadow value of remittances. Moreover, when a farm household 
decides to send out a migrant, this has simultaneous implications on its productive capacity 
and may modify productivity-enhancement choices, such as a change of agricultural 
technology. Farm household decides about its present labour and other inputs allocations, on 
                                                 
10 One perspective is that remittances tend to be used for conspicuous consumption rather than investment: for 
house construction or the sponsoring or weddings and the like, rather than improvements that are likely to lead to 
increasing agricultural productivity. A common use of remittances, nevertheless, is also to pay for education of 
the next generation and that does appear to be a clear investment strategy. However, a clear distinction between 
investment and consumption may be difficult to maintain in the context of the use of remittances. There is an 
important indirect effect of remittances money in the villages (expenditure on house construction for example 
can stimulate local building enterprises etc.).  
11 Remittances are notoriously difficult to measure (money and goods) because of official and unofficial 
channels (through relatives or when they go back). Moreover, a typical assumption of much of the work on 
remittances is that migrants are all self-supporting, that is no economic support is given to migrants leaving 
household of origin. Lipton (1980) argues that net remittances are quite small relative to village income (they  
are much more concentrated on richer households in the village unlikely to suffer from capital constraints) and 
have a negative economic effects at home. Taylor (1992) and Adams (1991), on the other hand, show a more 
positive scenario. 
12 See Mendola (2004) for a literature review on this.   8
one hand, and on its investments in household’s (human and physical) resources and saving 
management strategy on the other. Therefore, when farm household resources are scarce (i.e. 
credit and risk constraints are binding), not all households are able to send migrants to work 
in a different market and even when they do so, it is not straightforward whether migration 
will result in a virtuous strategy - able to help relatives left behind to overcome production 
constraints and improve agricultural productivity- or in a poverty-trap. The body of economic 
literature that generally tends to conclude that migration is a subsistence strategy enabling 
households to escape poverty, fails to consider people not able to migrate and those who 
experience a poverty-trap because of migration. 
 
3.  Migration flows in Bangladesh  
 
In the past 25 years Bangladesh has experienced positive economic and social change. 
Nonetheless, it remains among the least developed countries. 
Historically migration has been a common subsistence strategy of Bangladeshi people, strictly 
correlated with colonialism. Long term permanent migration takes place typically towards the 
UK or US, although over time rigid immigration policies in western countries have limited 
further emigration from Bangladesh. During the 1970s the labour markets in the Middle East 
offered new scope for Bangladeshi migrant labour, and later such migration also expanded to 
the newly industrialised countries of South East Asia. 
Between 1976 and 2002 more than 3 million Bangladeshis have emigrated overseas for 
employment. Over the past 5 years, though, migration has declined due to substantial 
increases in the cost of migration and stiff competition from new sending countries. 
Determinants of both short and long-term migration are complex, resulting of many factors 
representing economic, social and cultural realities. According to official figures, international 
migrants are predominately young male, and female accounts for only 1%. This is so because 
the Bangladeshi government has banned certain types of female labour from independent 
emigration  but many choose to do so through unofficial channels. 
The labour force of Bangladesh working in different parts of the world is primarily made up 
of unskilled and semi skilled workers. In 2001 the professionals constituted only the three 
percent of the migrant worker against the 58 percent of unskilled workers (ILO). 
Over the last decades, also domestic migration has resumed greater importance as a 
component of people’s subsistence strategies and in shaping the national economy. According 
to recent surveys by the United Nations, International Labour Organization and the 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), rural to urban migration in Bangladesh accounts for   9
two-third of the overall migration flow (where the remaining 10 percent is represented by 
rural-rural migration and 24 percent by international migration) (see Afsar, 2000) . 
traditionally, most economic migrants to internal urban areas are young males, but this 
changed significantly with the recent increase in demand for female labour in the readymade 
garment factories of Dhaka Khulna and Chittagong metropolitan areas.  Remittances to rural 
areas have represented a crucial source of income for consumption and to expand business in 
agricultural products and construction materials. Remittances also helped to generate savings, 
the major source of capital in Bangladesh, in the absence of institutional credit on easy terms.  
Little studies are available on the migration patters of rural households in Bangladesh. It is 
assumed that the extreme poor people are more likely to gradually migrate to other parts of 
the country, passing through a period of temporary migration (Siddiqui, T. 2003). Some rural 
people also migrate internationally
13 but little data are available on the proportion of 
international migrants from rural areas. It has been argued that international migration 
typically generates sharply higher levels of remittances with respect to rural-rural or rural-
urban migration. Yet, in Bangladesh there are financial obligations to migrate abroad, which 
include the cost of purchasing a visa, the airfare, and commission costs to the recruiting 
agencies
14 (Afsar et al. 2000).  
 
 
4.  Data and descriptive statistics
15 
 
The empirical analysis is based on a survey of 5062 rural and urban households from 8 
villages in Chandina and Madhupur thanas  in Bangladesh,  conducted by the Institute of 
Development Studies in 1994/95. The survey collected detailed information on household 
characteristics, assets endowment, food production and non-farm activities. In each 
household, information on migration of household’s members was gathered, including 
                                                 
13 Bangladesh exports contract labour mostly to Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong. The UK and US are the two main destination in the 
West. Australia, Canada, Germany, France are also preferred countries for migration.   
14 The recruitment process of migrant workers in Bangladesh is quite complex. A host of intermediaries, some of 
which are official and formal, while other are dubious, dominate the whole process. The latter is mostly 
privatised and, after the selection process, the recruitment agency organizes the visa, travel documentation , air 
ticket and placement of workers in the receiving country against relatively high fees. Recently the proliferation 
of recruitment agencies has lowered the agency costs. 
15 A more detailed description of the data set is in Mendola 2003. This holds for figures on HYVs characteristics 
and productivity differentials as well.    10
information on duration and destination of migration, moving costs and remittances sent 
home by migrants
16.  
In the present study we restrict our sample to 3404 rural farm households only
17, among 
whom 30 percent have households members who left to work elsewhere. Yet, a crucial point 
of our study is to map three different types of migration: national temporary, national 
permanent,  international permanent migration
18. Moreover, the household, as the unit of 
analysis, is defined as the whole family, including migrant members, reflecting the NELM 
theoretical approach we adopt, which conceives migration as a family strategy.  
Incidences of different forms of migration are summarised in Table 1. Participation to 
migration has been identified through questionnaires asking the respondent (the household 
head) about whether anybody in the household had migrated and which destination for, along 
with some characteristics of migrant members. 
In 62 percent of the cases, only one of the household member was a migrant; in 27 percent of 
the cases there were two migrants; 9 percent of households had 3 migrants and in the 
remaining 1 percent four members migrated. When there is more than one migrant member in 
the same household, in the thirty percent of cases they do not belong to the same migration 





INCIDENCE OF MIGRATION AMONG HOUSEHOLDS 
Types of migration  Freq.  Percent 
No migration  2417 71
Temporary migration  411 12.07
Permanent migration  431 12.66
International migration  145 4.26
Tot. 3404 100
 
                                                 
16 Migration here, and throughout all the study, refers is to the so-called “free” population movements. Much 
migration is that of refugees, asylum seekers and the internally displaced (and they are often amongst the 
poorest), but this study does not address these forms of “forced” migration. Hence, the analysis and framework 
presented here is within the realm of generalisable variables rather than in circumstances of shock that involve an 
exogenous set of causal variables and dynamics.  
17 It should be noted that with more than 50 percent of sample households being small and medium-scale 
farmers, small holders are highly represented in our sample (with a higher concentration than at national level; 
BBS 1999). 
18 Economic literature has often avoided constructing typologies of migration arguing instead for the need to 
capture the overall dynamics of population movements. Yet, this approach may lead to rather simplistic view of 
migration flows and their implications at a micro-level. Indeed, domestic and international migrations in 
developing countries have been little researched in a simultaneous framework: the two kinds of migration have 
generally been treated as different processes. In reality, though, most developing countries experience both, often 
involving the same households or even individuals. Mapping out various types of movement can improve our 
understanding of the potential virtuous or adverse impacts of migration on poverty and development in local 
communities. 
19 This point will be discussed deeper further on (see section 5.1 below).   11
Overall, there are 1241 migrants in the sample distributed as follows with the following 
characteristics (Table 2):  
 
TABLE 2 
CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS 
MIGRATION TYPE  TEMPORARY  PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL 
521 562 158 Number of migrants 
(percentage)  (42%) (45%) (13%)
Average age of migrants  33.34 29.13 31.96
Average education of migrants (year of schooling)  1.24 5.42 6.15
Average migration spell (how many years before 
1995 migrants left for the first time)  8.7 7.6 3.5
Percentage of male migrants  99.62 95.02 100
Percentage of married migrants  84.45 56.23 64.56
Percentage of single migrants  14.97 42.53 34.81
 
Across different categories of migration, sample migrants are predominately men, young 
(around 30 years old) moving primarily to earn more money or find a job. What differs across 
types of migration is the educational level of migrants, clearly higher in the case of permanent 
and international migration, and in the latter cases the percentage of single migrants is also 
higher than in case of temporary migration
20. Eventually, international migration seems the 
most recent type of moving, as sample migrants left on average around 1991, while 
permanent migration started earlier and temporary migration more than eight years before 
1995. 
Figure 1 shows the sample average amounts of costs of moving and remittances sent back 
home, by different categories of migration. Migration costs as well as remittances are directly 
asked to the survey respondent, and they refer to initial costs sustained by the household to 
send out a migrant (i.e. costs of travel, visa, recruiting agency etc) and the amount of money 
they receive from her/him. 
It is clearly evident the increase in net-returns across typologies of migration, with 
international migration yielding the highest level of costs and remittances. Moreover, Tables 3 
shows the percentage of migrants remitting, which is very high in all categories, suggesting a 
high correspondence between migration and remittances sent back home. 
 
                                                 
20 Since the age of migrants is not very different, the single status of migrants can be considered as a ‘cost’ of 




























Table 4 shows some farm household characteristics across types of migration.  
In general, households with international migrants tend to be the largest
21 and wealthier, with 
the highest amount of land owned (also per adult equivalent - that is to say, controlling for 
households size does not change the strength of the correspondence), the highest amount of 
land operated, the lowest incidence of poverty and the highest total gross income
22. The 
opposite can be said for households who have temporary migrants among their members, 
namely they seem to be the worst-off with respect to all indicators. Households with no-
migrants, instead, appear more engaged than the others in such ‘diversified’ activities 
different from migration as cattle and off-farm activities. Though, they are poorer in terms of 
land and total income than households with international migrants.  
                                                 
21 It should be noted that household size may be endogenous, in that affected by the (successful) migration 
process, but there is little literature on the impact of migration on fertility in source households.  
22 The correlation between gross household income and land owned is 52%, which is not surprisingly high.   13
 
TABLE 4 
Characteristics of farm households by migration categories 
Variable NO  MIGRATION  TEMPORARY  PERMANENT  INTERNATIONAL 
  Obs Mean  St Dev.  Obs Mean  St Dev.  Obs Mean  St Dev.  Obs Mean  St Dev. 
Household characteristics and assets                              
Household size (including migrants)  2417 5,37 2,25 411 5,93 2,30 431  7,05 2,71 145 8,81 3,68
Average education level of hh. members  2417 1,85 2,15 411    0,91  1,53 431  2,85  2,63 145  3,53  2,15 
Land size (acre)  2417 0,77 1,37 411  0,47 1,16 431  0,84 1,08 145 1,81 1,92
Land size (p.a.e)  2417 0,18 0,29 411  0,09 0,19 431  0,15 0,20 145 0,25 0,24
Area of land operated (acre)  2417 1,97 2,20 411 1,38 2,78 431  1,6 1,77 145  2,8 3,06
Area of irrigated land (acre)  2417 0,89 1,36 411 0,31 0,93 431  0,39 0,82 145 0,62 0,73
Cattle owned (unit)  2417 1,19 1,74 411 0,57 1,13 431  0,75 1,19 145 1,15 1,45
Cattle owned (pae)  2417 0,27 0,39 411  0,11 0,20 431  0,13 0,23 145 0,15 0,18
Average number of migrants per household  2417 0 0,00 411 1,1  0,34 431  1,3 0,61 145 1,4 0  .64
                  
Income flows                 
Crop income (pae) (Taka)  2417 3212,41 4174,99 411 1259,79 6882,01 431  2125,13 3198,34 145 3865,26 6450,04
   Crop income as % of tot.income  2417 38% 0,28 411  20%  0,19 431  26% 0,21 145  22% 0,20
Agricultural income
 b (pae) 2417 1175,25 1320,58 411  628,1  762,97 431 922,61 1317,74 145  1318,19 1680,07
   Agricultural income as % of tot.income 2417 17% 0,17 411  13%  0,14 431  14% 0,15 145  9% 0,09
Off-farm income (excluding remittances) (pae)  2417 3135,85 4110,85 411  2456,27 4627,52 431  1202,28 1970,31 145  759,16 1479,74
   Off-farm income as % of tot.income  2417 43,31% 0,32 411 50,13%  0,21 431 18,50% 0,24 145 6,17% 0,11
Income from pond (pae)  2417 130,27 440,80 411 104,7  182,31 431 273,11 552,61 145 431,4 683,70
   Income from pond as % of tot.income  2417 2% 0,05 411  2%  0,04 431  4% 0,06 145  3% 0,04
Amount of 'temporary' remittances (pae) 2417 0 0,00 411  785,68  1342,54 431  67,66 334,45 145  22 105,20
Amount of ‘permanent’ remittances (pae) 2417 0 0,00 411  0  0,00 431  2619,19 3362,44 145  430,16 2488,83
Amount of ‘international’ remittances (pae)  2417 0 0,00 411  0  0,00 431  0 0,00 145  12842,9 34696,75
   Tot. remittances as % of tot.income  2417 0 0,00 411  15%  0,14 431  39% 0,28   60% 0,24
Total gross income (pae)  2417 7626,96 6488,28 411 5194,17  11673,76 431  7185,19 5991,46 145 19665,2 37887,29
Amount of total loans from Ngos (pae)  2417 331,95 1058,65 411 121,47 456,05 431  46,89 291,73 145 23,68 174,66
          
% of hhs adopting HYVs of rice   2417 24,6% 0,47 411  15.5%      0,36 431  15,6% 0,36 145  18,6% 0,39
% of poor households
a 2417 30,04% 0,46 411  51,34%  0,50 431 36,43% 0,48 145 4,83% 0,22
                                      
 Pae = per adult equivalent (including migrant members) 
a) The poverty line is based on the Food Adequacy Standard and has been set at 4200 Tk per (adult male equivalent) head per annum for 1994 (see Mendola 2003) 
b) Agricultural income = homestead earnings, livestock, wood, straw.    15
As decomposed income flows are concerned, households with international migrant members 
have the highest level of crop and agricultural income, and the lowest amount of off-farm 
income (excluding remittances) with respect to all the other categories. As shares of total 
income, though, the latter income flows represent a smaller percentage of total household 
earnings than it is the case in the other groups; this is due to the significantly high amount of 
remittances they receive from international migrants, which account for 60 percent of total 
income. Moreover, as for farming investments, figures show that relatively few farmers with 
temporary migrants adopt high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of rice, whilst the highest shares of 
adopting households belong to the group with ‘international’ migrants and with ‘no-migrants’. 
Thus, the crucial point here is to understand to what extent migration and remittances are 
complementary to other productive assets and activities but, given the endogenous nature of 
migration behaviour, descriptive statistics does not fully help in this regard.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that also land ownership - which is a proxy for household 
wealth – might be thought as endogenous but, given missing Bangladeshi land market, it can 
be reasonably assumed exogenous. In order to focus on the relationship between land asset 
and migration, Table 5 shows the distribution of the three types of migration by the standard 




Types of migration  Categories of 
landowners  No mig  Temporary Permanent International  Total 
853 133 74 8 1,068 Near landless 
(%)  79.8% 12.5% 6.9% 0.8% 100%
   
1,383 270 328 104 2,085 Small farms  
(%) 66.3% 13.0% 15.7% 5.0%  100%
   
181 8 29 33 251 Medium-Large farms  
(%) 72.1% 3.2% 11.5% 13.15%  100%
   
2,417 411 431 145 3,404 Total  71.0% 12.1% 12.7% 4.3% 100%
 
It is interesting to see that among families sending out migrants, near-landless do it mostly 
temporarily, small farmers have mainly temporary and permanent migrants, and medium-
large farmers have a majority of permanent and international migrants. This is important in 
the selection process of migration at household level.  
                                                 
23 Near-landless have less than 0.049 acres; small farms more than that and less than 2.49 acres; medium-large 
farmers have more than 2.5 acres. It is worth stressing that our dataset is skewed towards small and medium-
farmers, as there are only 17 sample farm households being ‘properly’ large, i.e. owning more than 7.50 acres of 
land.   16
5.  Estimation strategy and empirical results 
 
The empirical analysis we carry out is twofold and aims at answering to the following 
questions: What determines the decision to participate in the migration process? Is it always a 
“profitable” - in that constraints-alleviating - household strategy as suggested by the NELM 
insights? In particular, given the income uncertainty farm households typically face, does 
migration have any importance in risk-taking behaviour in agricultural production?   
The first step of our empirical strategy is estimating the determinants of household choice of 
having a migrant member in the household. Since there are different types of migration - 
which yield extremely different levels of (net) remittances as we saw above - we estimate 
household behaviour with respect to all types of moving, i.e. permanent, temporary and 
international migration, throughout binomial and multinomial logit models
24. 
In the second step of our empirical analysis, we estimate the impact of the three different 
typologies of migration on the adoption of high-productive varieties of rice, technology 
relatively more risky but higher yielding than traditional seeds. We do so through three-stage 
least squares (3sls) estimation of linear probability models, in order to solve the problem of 
simultaneous determination of migration and adoption decisions at household level. 
Understanding household migration behaviour in the first step is needed in order to estimate 
the economic effect of this endogenous process on the propensity to invest in agricultural 
activities in source farm households in the second step.  
The estimation strategy of a simultaneous linear probability equations aims at sorting out 
problems of both endogeneity of migration choices and cross-correlation of household 
decisions towards technology and migration. Linear probability models have the advantages 
that are generally more tractable for assessing causation and applicable to data with limited-
dependent outcome variable and dummy endogenous regressors (Angrist, 2001; see also 
below). Moreover, included explanatory variables shaping technology and migration actual 
investment decisions are often of greater analytical and policy interest than are latent index 
structural coefficients. Though, since the migration selection process is endogenous and 
shaped by many of the same characteristics that determine technology adoption in each 
regime, correct identification of the model depends on finding instrumental variables (IV) that 
affect technology adoption solely through their impact on migration choices. 
 
 
                                                 
24 See below for further explanations on this. It should be noted that we estimated linear probability models as 
well and results from the latter are similar to marginal effects predicted by non-linear binary models.   17
5.1 The determinants of different typologies of migration 
 
In the former section we saw that three existent types of migration, i.e. (domestic) temporary 
migration, (domestic) permanent migration, and international (permanent) migration, generate 
very different net-returns at household level. 
Thus, why do people decide to migrate in general, and why do they do it for a low vs high 
remunerative migration type? Our hypothesis is that, in a context of missing or rationed credit 
and insurance markets, household characteristics and migration entry costs shape the expected 
future return differentials and the decision to participate in a specific type of migration.  
Following the NELM theoretical framework, our unit of analysis is the household as a whole 
(including migrant members); this is to say that the spectrum of factors influencing the 
decision to migrate involves family characteristics and their endowment of human, physical 
and social capital. 
In the first place, we estimate a logit model for the migration decision overall, that is the 
probability of having a migrant member in the household i as a function of a set of household 
characteristics (plus a regional dummy) Xi. Thus, the dependent variable is defined as follows: 
Mi = 0, if household does not have any migrant member 
Mi = 1, if household has at least one member migrated for work. 





P= Prob(M  = 1) = 
 1+exp(X ' )
β
β
   i=1,...n  
where  β  coefficients are the effect of a marginal change in Xi on the log odds ratio of 







β  =  − 
 
The observable factors Xi determining the participation to the migration process are: 
household demographic characteristics (that are also tied with family labour endowment), 
human capital-related attributes (including experience and schooling), cultural and social ties 
(e.g. religion, family network), economic and institutional environment (e.g. region of living) 
and the wealth position of the household. With respect to the latter, we included three capital-
related variables, i.e. landholdings, cattle owned
25 and agricultural capital (i.e farm equipment 
and owned tubewell for irrigation), in order to control for differences in physical capital 
across households. Yet, it is worth stressing the differences between assets, in particular the 
illiquid and liquid nature of land and cattle endowments. Land is the main inheritable form of 
                                                 
25 Both variables are included per adult equivalent (pae).   18
wealth for Bangladeshis households and the main asset (beyond labour) that allow people to 
invest in widening opportunities
26. Moreover, given that land market in Bangladesh is very thin 
or even missing, it is reasonable to treat land ownership as exogenous
27 
28. Cattle owning, on 
the other hand, is a form of saving or liquid asset, whose role is to cope with risk
29.  
Table 6 reports estimated coefficients and marginal effects for two logit model specifications 
of the migration decision rule. 
Interestingly, the land asset variable appears significant and negative in the first specification, 
but significant and positive when squared (second specification). The same holds for cattle 
endowment. This is to say that the negative effect of land and cattle endowment on migration 
marginally increases as assets increases.  
Being land a typical proxy for household wealth in Bangladesh, this result seems to suggest 
that at a lower level of wealth, a small increase in assets tends to discourage households to 
participate in the migration process, but the marginal propensity to migrate of better-off 
wealthy households increases in assets endowment. In other words, the non-linear U-shaped 
relationship between asset holding and migration seems to capture the role of fixed moving 





                                                 
26 Poor households typically own less land than the non-poor, and are highly represented among the near-
landless (i.e. those owning less than 0.05 acres) (WB 2003). Moreover, financial assets in the form of micro 
credit have become more available to the rural poor in the recent decades, thanks to successful innovations 
adopted by various non-governmental organizations in Bangladesh. However, despite tremendous progress in 
this area, land is still considered the main form of collateral by micro credit financial institutions and formal-
sector lenders. See note 13 above. 
27 Land is actually a great issue in Bangladesh because of its scarcity and because it is taken as a collateral in 
credit programmes. On the exogeneity of land ownership in Bangladesh see the debate between Morduch and 
Pitt (Pitt, 1988, Morduch, 1998, Pitt, 1999). 
28 The exogeneity of land ownership challenges the potential inverse relationship between (past) migration and 
(today’s) wealth.  
29 It is commonly recognised that dependence on agriculture makes rural households more vulnerable to weather 
and price fluctuations and causes income fluctuations. Given the limited access to formal credit markets and 
social insurance, savings is an important tool for coping with income risk. Given the limited access to financial 
institutions, the most available form of savings for rural households in developing countries is livestock (the 
other forms of saving in kind are grain stock and land, but both are not easily realisable due to the tiny land 
market and to the lack of stocking utilities, especially for smallholder
 ), which serve as the major form of wealth 
and as an insurance substitute, yielding a positive expected return and providing risk-diversification benefits 
(Dercon, 1996). The existing literature on the risk-coping role of livestock generally find that the latter perform a 
function as a liquid asset , which enables rural households to direct more inputs into high-return activities. Thus, 
assuming credit constraints under which few farmers have access to credit, livestock play the same role NELM 
attributes to the migration process, that is liquidity and risk alleviation at a household level, although livestock 
may be a relatively cheaper investment than migration. In this sense owing livestock and participating in the 
migration process might be viewed as substituted in their economic effect in enabling farm households to 
overcome production constraints.    19
TABLE 6 
Determinants of migration decision (logit model) 
Specif. Specif. 
  (1) 
Marginal and 
fixed effects (2) 
Marginal and 
fixed effects
Number of males in the hh.  0.698 0.101 0.707  0.103
 (11.39)*** (11.44)*** 
Number of females in the hh.  0.189 0.027 0.193  0.028
 (2.75)*** (2.80)*** 
Number of children in the hh.  -0.115 -0.017 -0.113  -0.016
 (3.49)*** (3.41)*** 
Most educated in the hh  -0.044 -0.006 -0.021  -0.003
 -0.58 -0.27 
Age of hh. head  0.004 0.001 0.003  0.000
 -0.18 -0.13 
(Age of hh.head)
2 0 0.000 0  0.000
 -0.6 -0.52 
Religion (whether it is Muslim)  1.058 0.114 1.077  0.117
 (6.53)*** (6.59)*** 
Land owned (pae)  -1.112 -0.160 -1.622  -0.236
 (3.31)*** (4.73)*** 
[Land owned (pae)]
2 0.385  0.056
 (3.67)*** 
Cattle owned (pae)  -1.418 -0.204 -1.987  -0.289
 (5.69)*** (6.39)*** 
[Cattle owned (pae)]
2 0.715  0.104
 (4.21)*** 
Farm equipment owned  -0.061 -0.009 -0.039  -0.006
 -0.64 -0.42 
Whether own tubewells  0.282 0.044 0.199  0.031
 -0.77 -0.54 
N. of hhs. In the ‘bari’  0.008 0.001 0.008  0.001
 -1.38 -1.42 
Self-poor assessment  -0.039 -0.006 -0.06  -0.009
 -0.37 -0.58 
% out-migrants in the village  4.401 0.634 4.42  0.644
 (5.32)*** (5.31)*** 
Regional dummy  -1.076 -0.154 -1.106  -0.159
 (2.61)*** (2.68)*** 
Constant -3.887 -3.879 
 (5.49)*** (5.43)*** 
Observations 3404 3404 
Pseudo R2  =  0.3352 0.3381 
Chi2(2) = 22.45 
Joint Sign.Land
1  P = 0.000 
Chi2(2) = 42.72 
Joint Sign.Cattle
2  P = 0.000 
% of correct predicted probabilities  80.35% 80.55% 
Robust - statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1 Joint significance of land owned and land owned squared. 
2 Joint significance of cattle owned and cattle owned squared. 
 
Other household characteristics have the expected sign in shaping the propensity to migrate, 
although the educational variable included in the model (i.e. the education level of the most 
educated person in the household) does not appear significant. This result would contradict   20
the human capital theory of migration and the argument of selectivity effects of individual’s 
skills and education on migration (Sjaastad, 1962). Yet, if education typically promotes rural 
out-migration, it does not do so with respect to all potential migrant destinations. Therefore, 
the effects of some human capital variables may differ across migrant destinations and this 
calls for a better mapping and estimation of different typologies of migration decision. 
More in general, as we argued above, household variables (that influence individuals’ income 
creation as migrants and/or non migrants) and migration costs significantly affect the decision 
to send a household member to work in a different market, so that heterogeneity of household 
strategies toward migration needs to be better disentangled. Thus, in the next tables we 
present migration probability models for different typologies of migration conceived as 
separated household alternatives.  
Firstly, we carry out three logit models in order to separately predict the probability to migrate 
temporary, permanently or internationally (with respect to “all the other options” respectively, 
including non-migration). Secondly, we estimate a multinomial logit in order to estimate more 
specifically the relative probability of household participating in one of the three categories of 
migration with respect to the option of staying put. We do so because household migration 
decision has multiple outcomes, which are not close substitutes for each other, though. Thus, 
if on one hand three binary logit models include redundant information, on the other hand the 
multinomial logit has some potential weakness
30. Still, the latter model provides more 
information about the simultaneous effects of independent variables across different migration 
outcomes, allowing for comparisons among all combinations of the categorical dependent 
variable.  
Table 7 show three logit estimation results (for comparison purposes, Table A.1. in Appendix 
shows results from linear probability models).  Migration types have been identified from the 
household survey in the following way: 
M
T
i = 1, if household has at least one temporary migrant; M
T
i = 0 otherwise; 
M
P
i = 1, if household has at least one permanent migrant;  M
P
i = 0 otherwise; 
M
I
i = 1, if household has at least one international migrant;  M
I






                                                 
30 By assumption, the odds ratios in the multinomial logit model are independent of the other alternatives. On 
models for nominal outcomes see Greene 1997, and J. Scott Long, 1997.   21
TABLE 7 
Determinants of participation to different categories of migration (logit models) 
   TEMPORARY   PERMANENT   INTERNATIONAL 
   Raw Coeff.
Marginal and 
fixed effects Raw Coeff.
Marginal and 
fixed effects  Raw Coeff. 
Marginal and 
fixed effects
Number of males in the hh.  0.264 0.013 0.258 0.014  0.453  0.003
   (3.49)***  (3.92)***  (4.87)***  
Number of females in the hh.  -0.054 -0.003 0.039 0.002  0.334  0.002
   -0.65  -0.51 (3.33)***   
Number of children in the hh.  -0.082 -0.004 -0.136 -0.007  0.076  0.000
   (2.04)**  (3.31)***  -1.36  
Most educated in the hh  -0.814 -0.040 0.512 0.028  0.521  0.003
   (7.44)***  (5.86)***  (3.61)***  
Age of hh. head   -0.014 -0.001 0.072 0.004  -0.011  0.000
   -0.44  (2.40)**  -0.25  
(Age of hh.head)
2 0 0.000 -0.001 0.000  0  0.000
   -0.04  (2.06)**  -0.02  
Religion (whether it is Muslim)  2.852 0.061 -0.075 -0.004  0.885  0.004
   (5.39)***  -0.42 (2.98)***   
Land owned (pae)  -2.674 -0.130 -1.392 -0.076  3.57  0.022
   (4.45)***  (3.13)***  (3.10)***  
[Land owned (pae)]
2 0.673 0.033 0.291 0.016  -2.388  -0.015
   (5.39)***  (2.78)*** (2.33)**   
Cattle owned (pae)  0.275 0.013 -1.45 -0.079  -2.351  -0.015
   -0.47  (3.90)***  (1.96)**  
[Cattle owned (pae)]
2 -0.75 -0.037 0.626 0.034  0.147  0.001
   -1.19  (3.57)*** -0.08   
Farm equipment owned  -0.128 -0.006 -0.148 -0.008  -0.012  0.000
   -0.59  -1.17  -0.1  
Whether own tubwells  -0.268 -0.012 0.537 0.036  0.645  0.005
   -0.45  -1.07  -1.04  
N. of hhs. in the ‘bari’  0.001 0.000 0.01 0.001  -0.008  0.000
   -0.09  -1.47  -0.71  
Self-poor assessment  0.34 0.017 -0.115 -0.006  -1.143  -0.007
   (2.60)***  -0.91 (4.39)***   
% out-temp. migrants in the village  10.397 0.506 -1.636 -0.089 -0.041  0.000
   (4.27)***  -0.7  -0.01  
% out-perm. migrants in the village  -9.677 -0.471 11.811 0.641  1.91  0.012
   (2.36)**  (2.94)***  -0.25  
% out-intern. migrants in the village  -7.316 -0.356 3.916 0.213  15.936  0.098
   (2.58)***  -1.35 (3.24)***   
Network   -0.04 -0.002 1.2 0.106  0.552  0.004
   -0.16  (5.88)*** (1.87)*   
Regional dummy  -3.407 -0.206 0.068 0.004  -1.503  -0.010
   (4.07)*** -0.08   -1.04  
Constant -1.462 -6.783   -7.292   
   -1.24 (6.15)***   (4.12)***  
Observations 3404 3404   3404   
Pseudo R2       =       0.248   0.257    0.351  
Chi2(2)=29.04 Chi2(2) =9.83 Chi2(2)=11.78  
Joint Sign.Land
1  P = 0.000   P = 0.007    P = 0.002  
Chi2(2) = 2.89 Chi2(2)=16.27 Chi2(2)=15.25  
Joint Sign.Cattle
2           P = 0.23            P=0.000             P=0.000  
% of correct predicted probabilities 87.93%   88.22%     96.09%   
Robust - statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
1 Joint significance of land owned and land owned squared.   
2 Joint significance of cattle owned and cattle owned squared.   
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The most interesting figure is the relationship between migration and land asset endowment, 
which is downward sloping in cases of temporary and permanent migration, and inversely 
shaped for international migration
31. This is to say that land owned (i.e. household wealth) has 
a negative, marginally increasing, effect on the household propensity to have a domestic 
migrant (in particular, either temporary or permanent), and a positive, marginally decreasing, 
effect on the probability to send a migrant abroad (Figure A.1 in Appendix illustrates the 
predicted probabilities for the three migration outcomes according to household land 
ownership). The relationship between migration and cattle endowment, instead, is mainly 
negative across the three typologies of migration, marginally increasing in case of permanent 
migration only: this seems to suggest that migration and cattle are substitute activities (or 
cattle is sold to finance migration) and the reason for this may lie in the theoretical argument 
that cattle is a liquid asset, playing the ‘same’ role as migration in the household risk 
management
32.  
The education level of the most educated person in the household results now significant and 
with opposite signs across migration types, as expected, since temporary migration is mainly 
devoted to low-skill jobs, differently from the other two types of movements
33.  
Given that migration is a function of networks and contacts as well (and given that our survey 
did not include much information on this), we use the presence of more than one migrant in 
the household left more than three years prior to the survey year, as a proxy for (familiar) 
social capital or chain migration (this is the ‘network’ variable).  
Results show that the presence of another household member emigrated time ago is an 
important factor in fostering especially permanent migration, and it is not significant for 
temporary migration. This is consistent with the recent and scattered nature of international 
migration, and with the more cultural and policy-driven permanent domestic migration in 
Bangladesh. 
Of course the migration history of the village (the proportion of the sample village labour 
force out-migrated either temporary, permanently and internationally)
34 is highly correlated 
                                                 
31 We find evidence of the first part of a U-shaped and hump-shaped land-migration relationship in case of 
temporary/permanent and international migration respectively. We will discuss deeper these non-linear 
relationships further on. 
32 Nonetheless, if cattle and migration are similarly household saving-strategies to cope with risk and liquidity 
constraints, the ‘scale’ of the strategy is different in that migration has sharply higher entry costs and subsequent 
returns which can have a big impact on the long-run household welfare. 
33 Ceteris paribus, a small increase in the educational level of the most educated household member decreases 
the probability of having a temporary migrant by 3.9 percentage points, increases the probability of having a 
permanent migrant by 2.7 percentage points and the one of having a international migrant by 0.3 percentage 
points. 
34 This variable represent the ‘emigration stock’ at village level and it is different from the ‘network’ variable, 
which captures the ‘chain effect’ within the same household.   23
with the propensity to migrate. These are proxy variables for ‘external’ migration networks 
capturing the idea that members of the village who have already out-migrated may help drive 
down some of the up-front cots of migration, as they share information about jobs in other 
areas with their neighbours
35.  
Eventually, it is worth noting the effect of a “behavioural” variable such as the self-
assessment of the household poverty status on the propensity to migrate. Ceteris paribus, 
being “self-poor” increase the propensity to migrate temporary (by 1.7 percentage points), is 
not significant and negative for permanent migration, and significantly decrease the 
propensity to migrate internationally (by 0.7 percentage points). This is consistent with all 
argued above. 
 
The former binary logit models estimated do not allow for all comparison among the relative 
probability to migrate either temporary, permanently and internationally with respect to the 
option of staying put. Therefore, a multinomial logit model is estimated. 
Yet, as we already mentioned above, some households have more than one migrant belonging 
to different categories or, differently said, migration typologies are not necessarily mutually-
exclusive within a same household. On the other hand, though, they are very different 
household strategies each of which entails highly different patterns in terms of both 
determinants and impacts on people left behind. Therefore - even if we are forced to overlook 
potential interactions between household migration strategies – we argue it is reasonable to 
kind of ‘order’ them in such a way that, if there is more than one migrant in the household, 
international migration category will be always captured, followed by permanent migration 
and then temporary migration
36. This is to say that the dependent variable of the multinomial 
logit is defined as follows:  
Mij = 0, if household i has no migrant members;  
Mij = 1 if household i has at least one migrant belonging to the jth category 
where j = temporary migration without any permanent or international migrant; permanent 
migration without any international migrant; international migration. 
                                                 
35 The literature on migration has largely emphasised the important role migration networks play in driving the 
decision to move (Taylor et. al. 1996). 
36 This is because the three types of migration involve different levels of investment costs (not only financial), 
whereby international and temporary migration and the highest and the lowest tails respectively. In this sense, if 
a household can afford sending a household member abroad, for example – which entails much higher costs and 
returns than other migration types - it would be insignificant whether it has also a migrant moving temporarily.    24
The multinomial logit model is specified as follows: let Pij be the probability that household i 
is in category j so that  ji j P =  1 ∑ . Differently from the logit model, the individual 





P  = P(M  = j) = 




The parameters  j β  measure the effect of Xi (the set of explanatory variables) on the relative 
probability of household i being in one of the j categories.  
Results of the estimation of the multiple migration-options model, where the base category is 
“no migration”, are shown in Table 8 
37. 
Findings are close to estimates from the binary models, although interpretation of coefficients 
allow for all comparisons among migration outcomes. According to Wald tests, the 
hypothesis that all coefficients are simultaneously insignificant across categorical outcomes is 
rejected at 0.01 level for all regressors but ‘farm equipment’ and ‘tubwell owned’. Wald test 
for combining outcomes is passed as well, meaning that the hypothesis that categories can be 
collapsed (namely, all coefficients except intercepts associated with given pair of outcomes 
are null) is rejected at 0.01 level. 
Looking at raw coefficients (i.e. marginal effects on the log odds ratios in terms of the base 
category), household demographic characteristics significantly affect the decision to migrate, 
with the reasonable exceptions of female adult members that seem not to influence (be 
involved in) temporary migration, and children not influencing international migration.  
As expected, the most educated household member has a significant positive effect in 
increasing the propensity to permanent and international migration with respect to non-
migration, and is negatively correlated with temporary migration. Muslim households show a 
higher propensity to migrate, and household subjective perception of being poor (‘self-poor 
assessment’) significantly increases the probability to migrate only temporarily and decreases 
international migration.  
                                                 
37 In our multinomial logit, though, the dependent variable is uneven in the sense that different migration 
categories have uneven number of observations. In particular small international migration likelihood has an 
influence on the calculated marginal effects for this group, which are bound to be smaller and less significant.   25
TABLE 8 
Determinants of participation to different categories of migration at household level (multinomial logit model) 
  Temporary mig  Permanent mig.  International mig. 
Migration-type  Coef.  z-stat. P-value Coef.  z-stat. P-value Coef.  z-stat. P-value 
          
Number of males in the hh.  0.60*** 4.73 0.00  0.70*** 12.49 0.00 0.90*** 7.52 0.00 
Number of females in the hh.  0.06  0.46 0.65  0.21*** 2.28 0.02 0.44*** 4.46 0.00 
Number of children in the hh.  -0.12*** -2.94 0.00 -0.15*** -6.76 0.00 0.00  -0.05 0.96 
Most educated in the hh  -0.68*** -3.66 0.00  0.35*** 4.67 0.00 0.51*** 2.11 0.03 
Age of hh. head  -0.01  -0.45 0.66  0.05  1.49 0.14 -0.01  -0.09 0.93 
(Age of hh.head)
2 0.00  -0.20 0.84  0.00  -1.47 0.14 0.00  -0.16 0.87 
Religion (whether it is Muslim)  3.02*** 4.09 0.00  0.53*** 2.54 0.01 1.26*** 6.50 0.00 
Land owned (pae)  -3.01*** -6.80 0.00  -1.70*** -2.86 0.00 2.11**  1.96 0.05 
[Land owned (pae)]
2 0.73*** 6.81 0.00  0.38*** 2.30 0.02 -1.63*  -1.74 0.08 
Cattle owned (pae)  -0.59*** -2.23 0.03  -2.36*** -11.00 0.00 -3.56*** -4.16 0.00 
[Cattle owned (pae)]
2 -0.22  -0.70 0.48  0.98*** 7.68 0.00 0.85  0.68 0.50 
Farm equipment owned  -0.14  -0.63 0.53  -0.11  -0.85 0.40 -0.05  -0.28 0.78 
Whether own tubewells  -0.30  -0.50 0.62  0.50  1.28 0.20 0.78  1.47 0.14 
N. of hhs. In the ‘bari’  0.01  0.72 0.47  0.01*** 2.83 0.01 0.00  0.05 0.96 
Self-poor assessment  0.24*** 3.02 0.00  -0.13  -1.34 0.18 -1.12*** -3.52 0.00 
% out-temp. migrants in the village  10.97*** 14.58 0.00  1.96*** 4.16 0.00 2.15*** 2.93 0.00 
% out-perm. migrants in the village  -6.54*** -4.83 0.00  9.67*** 5.72 0.00 5.45*** 3.05 0.00 
% out-intern. migrants in the village  -4.47*** -5.62 0.00  5.31*** 3.99 0.00 17.58*** 10.00 0.00 
Regional dummy  -2.80*** -8.87 0.00  -0.48  -1.23 0.22 -1.40*** -2.60 0.01 
Constant -2.93*** -2.85 0.00  -6.96*** -7.12 0.00 -8.84*** -3.82 0.00 
Pseudo R2 =     0.3144                        
Joint Sign.Land
1:     Chi2(6) =  448.96                      
Prob > chi2 =    0.000                     
Joint Sign.Cattle
2:   Chi2(  6) = 4233.00                      
Prob > chi2 =    0.000                     
Robust - statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1 Joint significance of land owned and land owned squared.               
2 Joint significance of cattle owned and cattle owned squared.               
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Furthermore, results on wealth related assets (land, cattle and physical agricultural capital) are 
consistent with non-linear relations found in the separated binomial models above. In 
particular, on one hand a marginal increase in the size of land decreases (at an increasing rate) 
the probability to migrate either temporary or permanently; on the other hand it increases (at a 
declining rate) the probability of household to send a migrant member abroad with respect to 
the option of staying put. 
Cattle ownership, instead, has a negative effect on the propensity to migrate (at a lowering 
rate in case of permanent migration), and agricultural capital endowment does not appear 
significant (but mainly with negative signs). This seems to suggest that liquid assets are 
substitute investments of migration, as discussed above.  
Finally, the incidence of different typologies of migration at village-level, significantly affect 
the probability to migrate; interestingly, percentages of permanent or international migrants in 
the village negatively affect the probability to migrate only temporary, supporting the 
hypothesis of external behaviours influencing household decision to migrate. 
In order to show how land ownership affects the probability to migrate either temporary, 
nationally or internationally, Figure 2 illustrates the three summed predicted probabilities for 



































Figure 2: Summed predicted probabilities according to household land-ownership 
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The lowest line (temporary) plots the probability of having a temporary migrant for a given 
size of land owned. The upper line (permanent) plots the sum of the probability of having a 
temporary migrant or permanent migrant (i.e. the area between the two lines is the probability 
of having a permanent migrant only). And top line (international) plots the summed 
probability of migrating either temporary, permanently or internationally against the option of 
non-migrating (see also plotted probabilities in Figure A.2. in Appendix). The shape and areas 
of predicted probability clearly illustrate the non-linear relationship between land asset 
ownership and the household participation to the migration process. 
The differently-shaped non-linear relations can be explained as follows. Overall, at low level 
of wealth a marginal increase of land-ownership decreases the propensity to migrate. In 
particular, in cases of temporary and permanent migration, at low levels of land owned a 
marginal increase of land decreases the propensity to migrate for these specific destinations 
(more rapidly in case of temporary migration than permanent migration). This is consistent 
with the idea that these migration typologies are low-cost and low remunerative in terms of 
remittances, thereby also little ‘preferred’ by households. In case of international migration 
instead, at low levels of wealth the propensity to migrate abroad is close to nil because of high 
entry barriers. After a threshold level, though, (around 1,2 acre of land), a marginal increase 
in household wealth increases the propensity to migrate, specifically to migrate abroad. In 
other words, land ownership becomes a pushing factor that releases household constraints to 
migrate and favour outflows overseas. This is consistent with other findings on historical 
migration (such as Italian hump-shaped migration in early last century; see Faini and 
Venturini, 1994) and with the fact that Bangladesh is a very poor country
38 (therefore, we 
capture the first part of a hump-shaped wealth-international migration relationship).  
Along with reporting the model coefficients, we also show effects on log-odds ratios, which 
are useful to illuminate the dynamics among outcomes. They provide perhaps more 
illustrative information on the migration probabilities of household members with different 
characteristics than the marginal effects.  
Table 9 shows the (marginal and unit) effect on the odds ratio of main determinants of 





                                                 
38 In addition, our dataset is even more skewed towards smallholder poor families, being large holders less 
represented than at national level (see note 17).   28
TABLE 9 
Percentage Change in the Odds-ratio of typologies of migration at household level 
Variable:   b  z  P>|z|  %  %StdX
   
Most educated in the hh    
permanen-temporar 1.03 7.94 0.00 179.40  118.90
permanen-internat -0.16 -0.60 0.55 -14.70  -11.40
permanen-no_mig 0.35 4.67 0.00 42.10  30.80
internat-temporar 1.19 3.17 0.00 227.30  147.00
internat-no_mig 0.51 2.11 0.03 66.50  47.50
no_mig  -temporary  0.68 3.66 0.00 96.60  67.40
           
Land owned (pae)         
permanen-temporar 1.31 2.08 0.04 269.20  42.50
permanen-internat -3.80 -4.28 0.00 -97.80  -64.30
permanen-no_mig -1.70 -2.86 0.00 -81.70  -36.90
internat-temporar 5.11 6.53 0.00 16481.00  299.40
internat-no_mig 2.11 1.96 0.05 720.80  76.90
no_mig  -temporary  3.01 6.80 0.00 1920.20  125.80
           
Cattle owned (pae)         
permanen-temporar -1.77 -6.31 0.00 -83.00  -46.60
permanen-internat 1.19 1.20 0.23 230.30  52.60
permanen-no_mig -2.36 -11.00 0.00 -90.60  -56.60
internat-temporar -2.97 -3.08 0.00 -94.90  -65.00
internat-no_mig -3.56 -4.16 0.00 -97.20  -71.60
no_mig  -temporary  0.59 2.23 0.03 80.80  23.30
           
Self_poor assess.         
permanen-temporar -0.37 -6.46 0.00 -31.10  -17.00
permanen-internat 0.99 3.97 0.00 168.60  63.90
permanen-no_mig -0.13 -1.34 0.18 -12.40  -6.40
internat-temporar -1.36 -4.82 0.00 -74.30  -49.30
internat-no_mig -1.12 -3.52 0.00 -67.40  -42.90
no_mig  -temporary  -0.24 -3.02 0.00 -21.30  -11.30
         
b = raw coefficient         
z = z-score for test of b=0       
P>|z| = p-value for z-test       
% = percent change in odds for unit increase in X     
%StdX = percent change in odds for SD increase in X     
 
For example, the effect of a unit change in education of the highest educated household 
member increases the odds of permanent moving relative to the non-migration and temporary 
migration categories (by 42.1 and 179.4 percent respectively), but it decreases the odds ratio 
with respect to international migration (by 16.5 percent), holding all the other variables 
constant. Moreover, a unit more of land (per adult equivalent) has the effect of decreasing the 
odds ratio between non-migration category and all the other categories, with the exception of 
international migration (whose odd ratio is on turn always increased by a unit positive change 
of land). Thus, household ‘structural’ variables (wealth and social status), as well as human   29
capital are highly important in shaping household decisions with respect to the subsistence 
strategy of migration.  
Yet, according to the NELM approach, individual family members’ labour time is 
simultaneously  allocated between migration and non-migration work so as to maximise 
expected utility of the whole household. The interplay between the household decision to 
participate in different typologies of migration and the investment behaviour of household 
members left behind with respect to the adoption of risky farming technologies is the focus of 
the next section.  
 
5.2 Migration effects on source households’ agricultural productivity  
 
Investing in high-productivity technology, such as HYVs of rice, is subject to financial and 
risk constraints, which are strictly binding for small farmers living in contexts of missing 
credit and insurance markets. 
The NELM hypothesis that migration is a subsistence strategy enabling rural households to 
overcome investment constraints and achieve the transition to high-productivity agricultural 
techniques is tested through a system of equations, in order to address the issue of 
simultaneous household decisions towards investment in agricultural activities and alternative 
migration destinations. However, given the endogenous nature of the household migration, 
instrument variables are needed in order to identify migration equations.  
Thus, we estimate the potential impact of different typologies of migration, i.e. temporary (T), 
permanent (P) and international (I) migration, on the farm household propensity to adopt 
high-productivity seeds (as a proxy for the household risk-management capacity) through a 
3sls simultaneous equations linear probability model. For identification purpose, we use the 
sample proportions of households in the origin village participating to each separate migration 
typology as instrument variables. The latter are proxy variables for external and social 
migration networks (as explained above). Different village histories of migration – 
specifically for temporary, permanent and international migration - are likely to lower 
migration costs and increase the opportunities for village households to send out migrant 
members, but should not affect the propensity to adopt new farming technologies
39. 
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39 The same instrument is used in Rozell et al. 1999.   30
 
where Yi is a binary variable equal to 1 if household i adopts the new technology;  iT X  is a set 
of observed farm household variables influencing the choice of technology; and 
iT ε  is the 
random variable of the estimated equation. 
J
i M , are binary endogenous variables equal to 1 if the i
th household participates in the J
th 
migration alternative, i.e. to temporary, permanent or international migration
40 (and zero if 
there is no migrant members); iM X  is a vector of household characteristics influencing the 
decision to migrate (different effects may result across the three typologies of migration) and 
J
iM Z  are exogenous variables to be used in the “first stage” of the system as instruments for 
the endogenous migration variables; 
i
J
M ε is the random variable of each migration equation. 
Endogenous migration variables are correlated with the disturbance of the adoption equation, 
violating the assumption of ordinary least squares (Wu-Hausman F test rejects the null 
hypothesis that migration typologies are exogenous variables at 0.01 significance level)
41; 
further, the simultaneous decision problem entails that the error terms among equations are 
(cross-) correlated as well. We use 3sls estimation in order to take account of both 
simultaneity and endogeneity biases.  
Three-stage estimator uses an instrumental variables procedure to produce consistent 
estimates and generalised least squares to account for correlation structure in the disturbances 
across equations. Heckman and MaCurdy (1985) show that in case of simultaneous linear 
probability models, instrumental variable procedure produces consistent estimates.  
This approach is the most tractable for our aim at estimating causal or potential effect of 
migration on the propensity to adopt risky technologies, rather than latent index coefficients 
(see Angrist, 2001)
42. This is so because the two-stage and single-stage estimates are directly 
comparable. For robustness purpose, though, Table A.2 in appendix presents structural results 
of a probit adoption model estimated using instrumental-variable-probit (or Amemiya 
                                                 
40 This is done in the same way as for the multinomial logit above, making categories mutually exclusive (i.e. 
household cannot belong to more than one category). 
41 For comparison purposes, the adoption equation has been estimated using simple OLS but results are not 
encouraging for migration typologies. However, the estimation procedure ignores the problem of endogeneity of 
migration decisions and the possible cross-equation correlation. As a raw check of endogeneity, we also included 
three interacted variables between typologies of migration and the size of land owned by household. Signs of 
interaction variables for permanent and international migration turn to be significant, suggesting that these types 
of migrations coupled with land ownership may have a potential effect on the propensity to adopt a superior 
agricultural technology. 
42 Limited dependent variable models with dummy endogenous regressors were first estimated using 
distributional assumptions and maximum likelihood (Heckman, 1978, Amemiya, 1978, Newey, 1985). Angrist 
(2001) argues that if the aim is to estimate causal or potential effect on the outcome of interest - rather than 
structural parameters of latent variables model - linear models are no less appropriate for binary dependent 
variables than non-linear models.   31
Generalized Least Squares (AGLS) estimator)
43. We get structural coefficients on latent 
(utility) variable but, as expected, marginal effects on the probability of observing a one in the 
probit model is very similar to results of the former linear probability model (for comparison 
purpose, two and three-stage linear probability estimators and presented in the same table in 
Appendix). 
 
In the first equation of the model (5.1), which explains the adoption of modern seeds, the 
dependent variable is equal to one if farm household has adopted the risky HYVs. As 
explanatory variables we include farm household characteristics such as household 
demographic variables, representative of family labour endowment; the average level of 
education of household members, which is not expected to be highly significant with respect 
to the relatively well known ‘green revolution’ technology package; the amount of cultivated 
land and land tenure, in order to take into account ‘tenurial-insecurity’ effects on risk 
management; farm equipment and means of ploughing owned; the quality of land (i.e. the 
percentage of irrigated land); pond
44 and cattle ownership, to take into account productive 
activities diversification; the ratio between land and family-labour endowment (whose 
negative sign suggests that HYVs are more labour-intensive crop than traditional ones); 
religion and self poor assessment of the household; regional dummy variable (equal to one 
whether household lives in Madhupur)
45. 
 
Specification of migration equations is based on the first part of our empirical analysis 
conducted above about the determinants of temporary, permanent and international migration. 
Along with instruments, we include other (exogenous) variables as determinants of migration, 
such as demographic characteristics, the educational level of the most educated household 
member, the amount of land owned per consumption unit and the family migration ‘network’. 
Table 10 reports econometric results of 3sls estimate of the system of equations, results that 
are robust to a number of alternative specifications.   
                                                 
43 This method is closely related to the Heckman two-step procedure (Heckman 1978 p. 947) according to which 
if the purpose of the analysis is to estimate the final equation of interest (in our case technology adoption), it is 
possible to generate instrumental variables for endogenous regressors by estimating a linear probability model 
and with plug-in fitted results standard two-stage least squares procedure applies.  Though, this procedure would 
yield incorrect standard errors and for this reason, Amemiya Generalized Least Squares is used to recover correct 
standard error estimates (see Maddala 1983, pp. 247-252 and Newey, 1987).  
44 Ponds are very important in rural Bangladesh life. They have multi-purpose usages. They are one of 
the water sources for the rural households, livestock and irrigation. Moreover, ponds are used for small-scale 
culture fisheries at a household level, thereby contributing to activity diversification. 
45 On the adoption of HYVs in Bangladesh see Mendola 2003.   32
TABLE 10: 3sls estimate of the impact of different typologies of migration on HYVs adoption 
 D EPENDENT VARIABLES 
  ADOPTION OF HYVS TEMPORARY MIG.P ERMANENT MIG. INTERNATIONAL MIG.
Temporary migration  -0.23  
 (1.98)**  
Permanent migration  -0.269  
 (2.69)***  
International migration  0.577  
 (2.93)***  
Number of males in the hh.  0.015 0.016 0.032  0.019
 -1.56 (2.70)*** (5.34)***  (5.18)***
Number of females in the hh.  -0.005 -0.009 0.004  0.024
 -0.41 -1.22 -0.57  (5.14)***
Number of children in the hh.  0.012 -0.008 -0.011  0.006
 (2.29)** (2.27)** (3.26)***  (2.68)***
Average years of schooling in the hh.  -0.001  
 -0.11  
% of land owned   0.004  
 -0.59  
Amount of land operated  0.144  
 (6.08)***  
% of temple land  -0.026  
 (2.12)**  
% of cash-in land  0.003  
 -0.06  
% of mortgaged-out land  -0.056  
 (2.05)**  
Farm equipment owned  0.008  
 -0.78  
Power means of ploughing  0.038  
 (2.45)**  
Land-labor ratio  -0.059  
 (2.16)**  
Whether own pond  0.064  
 (3.27)***  
Self-poor assessment  -0.071 0.029 -0.009 -0.037
 (3.80)*** (2.60)*** -0.77  (5.20)***
Regional dummy  0.133 -0.081 0.052 0.031
 (3.69)*** (2.93)*** -1.32  (2.72)***
% of irrigated land  0.286  
 (12.13)***  
Religion (whether it is Muslim)  0.18 -0.031  0.042
 (9.26)*** -1.61  (3.55)***
Land owned (pae)  -0.133 -0.133  0.056
 (4.08)*** (4.13)***  (2.81)***
[Land owned (pae)]
2 0.043 0.029  -0.02
 (3.25)*** (2.18)**  (2.50)**
Cattle owned (pae)  0.117 -0.045 -0.11  -0.058
 (4.61)*** -1.49 (3.67)***  (3.17)***
[Cattle owned (pae)]
2 0.021 0.061  0.017
  -1.06 (3.14)*** -1.44
Family network  0.003 0.307  0.094
  -0.1 (12.06)*** (5.94)***
Most educated in the hh  -0.064 0.048  0.017
 (7.88)*** (5.97)***  (3.42)***
Constant 0.036 0.02 -0.095  -0.153
 -0.73 -0.5 (2.01)**  (8.13)***
Instruments:   
% temp.migrants in the village  0.799  
 (5.61)***  
% perm.migrants in the village  1.015 
  (5.63)*** 
% intern.migrants in the village    1.029
   (8.77)***
Observations 3404 3404 3404  3404  33
Table 11 presents F-tests for the first stage of the 3sls procedure
46 and shows that our 
instruments are closely related to the variables they are instrumenting for, limiting the 
potential for weak instruments, especially in the specification with many controls. 
 
TABLE 11 
First-stage F-tests for the instruments 
 Endogenous  variable 
  Temp. Mig. Perm. Mig. Intern. Mig.
     
F-Stat. 10,97 9,93 24,31
P.Value 0,00 0,00 0,00
 
With respect to results shown in Table 10, all explanatory variables of the propensity to adopt 
modern seeds have the expected sign; in particular, the amount of land operated is positively 
correlated with the propensity to adopt, while tenure insecurity (the share of temple and 
mortgaged-out land) has a negative impact on that. The percentage of irrigated land and 
power means of ploughing have a significant positive sign, whilst the negative sign of the 
land-labour ratio variable suggests that HYVs are more labour-intensive crop than traditional 
ones
47. 
The impact of migration on the propensity to adopt high-yielding varieties of seeds depends 
on which type of migration households participate in and, in turn, on the determinants of the 
migration decision. Our findings show that migration significantly affects agricultural 
technology upgrading; however, while having a household member migrated abroad has a 
positive effect in fostering household propensity to adopt modern and risky seeds, domestic 
temporary and permanent migration have a negative impact on the adoption propensity in 
source households. Therefore, if migration is a risk and credit-alleviating strategy, this seems 
not to be true for all types of migration in Bangladesh. Explanations for this may lie on both 
risk and credit arguments: indeed, overseas economic opportunities are likely to be less 
correlated with local earnings and provides much higher returns (remittances) than it is the 
case for domestic migration. 
In this sense international migration acts as a shelter against local uncertain income prospects, 
as predicted by the NELM perspective and shown by our results. However, given that 
migration is an endogenously shaped process, this seems not to hold for all farm households. 
 
                                                 
46 They test for the joint significant of the instruments in regression of the endogenous migration variables on all 
exogenous variables in the system.  
47 For a deeper discussion on determinants of HYVs adoption in Bangladesh see Mendola, 2003.   34
Indeed, all other estimated results are consistent with what we found above about 
determinants of different types of migration: a small increase in household wealth (land 
owned) and human capital endowment (highest level of education) lowers the propensity to 
participate in temporary and permanent migration and increases the household propensity to 
participate in international migration
48. Therefore, wealthy households able to overcome 
‘entry barriers’ to international migration will on turn be more likely to employ modern 
farming technology, thereby achieving higher productivity. Asset-poorer households, on the 
other hand, are unable to support migration costs and fall back on domestic migration, which 
does not help them to overcome financial or risk constraints locking them into poor 
productive performance. This, in turn, raises questions on the potential role of international 





According to the NELM approach, the typical migrant is part of a rural extended family who 
dispatches members to other places of employment to generate capital and to obtain new 
investment opportunities (e.g. change of technology) for the family farm.  
The main idea underlying this study is that if on the one hand imperfections in capital and 
insurance markets constitute a motivation to migrate – as stated by the NELM hypothesis, on 
the other hand they also may represent a constraint to do it; this is so because migration is a 
form of lumpy investment, especially onerous for such households as those living in poor 
rural areas of Bangladesh. Therefore, determinants of migration simultaneously shape the 
economic impact of having a migrant member on farm households left behind. This has 
important implications while seeking to understand the complex linkages between migration 
opportunities and economic development in local communities.  
Assuming that higher initial asset holdings make it less likely that liquidity constraints bind, 
our empirical evidence shows that household’s wealth-related capital (mainly in the form of 
land) is crucial in shaping heterogeneous migration behaviour towards different typologies of 
migration. Asset-poor farm households are more likely to enter into domestic migration with 
low entry costs, and low returns. Entry into high-return migration (i.e. international 
migration), in which most households would probably like to engage in a ‘first-best’ 
perspective, is restricted to richer and large-holder households. In particular, throughout a 
multinomial logit model estimation, we find that at low level of wealth, an increase in asset 
ownership reduces, at different rates, the propensity to migrate either temporarily, 
                                                 
48 Also owing cattle has the same impact as found in the first part of inferential analysis? Here it might be not 
strictly exgenous, though, but the exclusion of it does not change much estimation results.    35
permanently or abroad. At higher level of household wealth, though, asset ownership stops 
being a constraint and becomes a pushing factor to outflows overseas only; this captures the 
effects of high entry costs to international moving and household liquidity constraints in non-
linearly  shaping migration behaviour. Indeed, higher asset holdings release household 
constraints to move abroad and favour high-return international migration. 
These findings seem to challenge both conventional arguments that absolute poverty raises 
out-migration or that better-off households stay put. On the other hand, they highlight the 
importance of entry migration constraints, which act as pushing or restrain factors differently 
across household wealth distribution.  
Furthermore, not all migration destinations may play the same role in mitigating household 
credit or risk constraints at origin. We estimated the economic impact of having a migrant 
member - either temporary, permanent or international - on the propensity to adopt new high-
productivity farming technologies, such as modern seeds of rice, in source rural households. 
We found that international migration has a positive effect on the investment in a superior 
agricultural technology, whilst temporary and permanent migrations do not encourage such a 
risky agricultural investment. The estimation strategy we used is a simultaneous equations 
model, in order to take into account both the endogenous migration choice and the cross-
correlation of household decisions with respect to its (human and physical) resources 
allocation. 
We interpret our results as evidence that if migration is a profitable alternative household 
activity, entry constraints may limit the access to it and its usefulness as income 
diversification strategy. Lack of resources to bear the costs of migration faced by poor 
households may generate a poverty trap whereby only better-off households have access to 
the most ‘profitable’ type of migration and are able to exploit a virtuosos circle of 
complementarities between overseas economic opportunities and productive activities at 
origin. This intends to question the idea that migration is a straightforward strategy to escape 
poverty, and to emphasise the potential role of a better distribution of resources and 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: Determinants of participation to different typologies of migration 























Number of males in the hh.  0.013 0.023 0.014 0.029  0.003  0.003
   (3.80)*** (3.93)***    (4.58)***
Number of females in the hh.  -0.003 -0.006 0.002 0.005  0.002  0.025
   -0.84 -0.6    (4.16)***
Number of children in the hh.  -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 -0.012  0.000  0.007
   (2.33)** (2.91)***    (2.51)**
Most educated in the hh  -0.040 -0.065 0.028 0.046  0.003  0.018
   (8.67)*** (5.51)***    (3.42)***
Age of hh. head   -0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.004  0.000  -0.003
   -0.3 (1.84)*    (2.48)**
(Age of hh.head)
2 0.000 0 0.000 0  0.000  0
   -0.32 -1.53    (1.86)*
Religion (whether it is Muslim)  0.061 0.086 -0.004 -0.043  0.004  0.044
   (12.08)*** -1.62    (2.78)***
Land owned (pae)  -0.130 -0.115 -0.076 -0.124  0.022  0.057
   (3.74)*** (4.22)***    (2.65)***
[Land owned (pae)]
2 0.033 0.038 0.016 0.027  -0.015  -0.019
   (1.94)* (2.96)***    (2.35)**
Cattle owned (pae)  0.013 -0.034 -0.079 -0.095  -0.015  -0.072
   -1.43 (3.65)***    (4.75)***
[Cattle owned (pae)]
2 -0.037 0.011 0.034 0.05  0.001  0.03
   -0.92 (2.91)***    (3.87)***
Farm equipment owned  -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.011  0.000  0.007
   -0.8 -1.41    -0.96
Whether own tubwells  -0.012 0.063 0.036 0.011  0.005  -0.006
   (4.52)*** -0.45    (1.87)*
N. of hhs. in the ‘bari’  0.000 0 0.001 0.002  0.000  0
   -0.47 (1.65)*    -0.53
Self-poor assessment  0.017 0.033 -0.006 -0.01  -0.007  -0.036
   (2.82)*** -0.88    (5.09)***
% out-temp. migrants in the village  0.506 1.056 -0.089 -0.046  0.000  0.087
   (4.01)*** -0.17    -0.5
% out-perm. migrants in the village  -0.471 -0.794 0.641 1.359  0.012  -0.033
   -1.63 (2.76)***    -0.46
% out-intern. migrants in the village  -0.356 -0.632 0.213 0.391  0.098  0.928
   -1.51 -0.98    (3.36)***
Network   -0.002 0.005 0.106 0.312  0.004  0.087
   -0.16 (7.64)***    (2.86)***
Regional dummy  -0.206 -0.251 0.004 0.169  -0.010  0.006
   (2.37)** -1.58    -0.08
Constant 0.213 -0.299    -0.056
   (1.80)* (2.55)**    -0.72
Observations 3404 3404    3404
Robust - statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table A.2: Impact of different typologies of migration on HYVs adoption 
 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Estimator:  ivprob- 
coeff. 
ivprob- 
marg. effects  3sls 2sls 2sls- 
robust s.e. 
Temporary migration  -0.963 -0.226 -0.23 -0.214 -0.214
 (2.05)** (2.05)** (1.98)** (1.80)* (1.76)*
Permanent migration  -1.509 -0.293 -0.269 -0.309 -0.309
 (3.65)*** (3.65)*** (2.69)*** (3.02)*** (2.85)***
International migration  2.68 0.554 0.577 0.509 0.509
 (3.32)*** (3.32)*** (2.93)*** (2.52)** (2.32)**
Number of males in the hh.  0.07 0.022 0.015 0.019 0.019
 (1.82)* (1.82)* -1.56 (1.95)* (1.77)*
Number of females in the hh.  -0.008 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001
 -0.18 -0.18 -0.41 -0.07 -0.07
Number of children in the hh.  0.042 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013
 (2.06)** (2.06)** (2.29)** (2.54)** (2.47)**
Average years of schooling in the 
hh.  0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001
 -0.28 -0.28 -0.11 -0.2 -0.19
Percentage of land owned   0.03 0.009 0.004 0.016 0.016
 -0.6 -0.6 -0.59 (2.02)** (2.60)***
Amount of land operated  0.47 0.15 0.144 0.156 0.156
 (4.66)*** (4.66)*** (6.08)*** (6.14)*** (4.82)***
Percentage of temple land  -0.079 -0.025 -0.026 -0.028 -0.028
 -1.57 -1.57 (2.12)** (2.16)** -1.21
Percentage of cash-in land  -0.046 -0.015 0.003 -0.015 -0.015
 -0.19 -0.19 -0.06 -0.23 -0.21
Percentage of mortgaged-out land -0.616 -0.197 -0.056 -0.113 -0.113
 (4.36)*** (4.36)*** (2.05)** (3.92)*** (3.60)***
Cattle owned (pae)  0.365 0.117 0.117 0.108 0.108
 (3.85)*** (3.85)*** (4.61)*** (4.22)*** (3.74)***
Farm equipment owned  -0.008 -0.002 0.008 0.004 0.004
 -0.19 -0.19 -0.78 -0.36 -0.27
Power means of ploughing  0.086 0.028 0.038 0.03 0.03
 -1.34 -1.34 (2.45)** (1.80)* (1.75)*
Land-labor ratio  -0.283 -0.09 -0.059 -0.071 -0.071
 (2.40)** (2.40)** (2.16)** (2.53)** (2.44)**
Whether own pond  0.224 0.072 0.064 0.054 0.054
 (2.60)*** (2.60)*** (3.27)*** (2.56)** (2.71)***
Self-poor assessment  -0.211 -0.067 -0.071 -0.073 -0.073
 (2.90)*** (2.90)*** (3.80)*** (3.87)*** (3.84)***
Region dummy  0.345 0.111 0.133 0.121 0.121
 (2.37)** (2.37)** (3.69)*** (3.27)*** (3.20)***
Percentage of irrigated land  1.029 0.328 0.286 0.286 0.286
 (10.46)*** (10.46)*** (12.13)*** (11.20)*** (11.10)***
Constant -1.442 0.036 0.038 0.038
 (7.34)*** -0.73 -0.77 -0.73
Observations 3404 3404 3404 3404 3404
          
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (robust in model (5) accounting for potential heteroscedasticity) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 